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MIRANDA OSHIGE MCGOWAN* 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that a judge should interpret 
statutes, not rewrite or impose her own preferred meaning upon them.  
As with most universally acknowledged truths, we all merrily embrace it 
on a theoretical level, but we bash swords when time comes to apply it.  
Judges, lawyers, and scholars have argued for ages about what methods 
of statutory or constitutional interpretation find the text’s meaning (and 
therefore interpret) rather than impose or create meaning (rewrite).  We 
show no signs of stopping.  The stakes of these arguments could not be 
higher: nothing less than judicial and legal legitimacy seem at risk, for 
the rule of law requires that laws, not persons, decide cases.  Judicial 
decisions that do more than interpret statutes and constitutions are 
branded lawless.  Judges tempted from the task of interpretation usurp 
the role of the legislature—the law’s equivalent of crossing the beams:1 
“there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.”2 
What do we do when we interpret texts, and how do we know when 
we are doing something else?  Steven Knapp, Walter Benn Michaels,3 
and Stanley Fish4 contend that a text means exactly what its author 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  Many thanks to Larry Alexander 
and the other members of the Institute for Law and Philosophy for organizing and 
hosting an extraordinary roundtable on the question of legal interpretation. 
 1. GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984). 
 2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, 
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1752)). 
 3. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 
723 (1982). 
 4. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO) 182 (1994) (“There is only one style of interpretation—the intentional style . . . .”). 
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intended it to mean.  Interpreting a text—any text—requires no more and 
no less than recovering that meaning.  If true, this claim (known as 
Intentionalism) could have profound consequences for law and legal 
interpretation.  Once combined with the rule of law, Intentionalism seems to 
imply that judges who wish to interpret law should construe and apply 
statues to accord with the intent of the legislature.  Intentionalism also 
seems to imply that judges who construe statutes some other way behave 
lawlessly. 
This essay argues that Intentionalism’s definition of interpretation 
entails nothing about the legitimate scope of the judicial role and 
commits a judge to no particular method of textual construction.  My 
argument follows in three parts.  First, I will set the stage by explaining 
Intentionalism in greater detail and exploring how Intentionalism 
challenges lawyers’ views of interpretation.  Second, I will discuss the role 
interpretation plays in legal decisionmaking.  Though we often say that 
judges should “interpret” the law, I will argue that deciding a case under 
law necessarily includes noninterpretive tasks.  Even when it appears 
that a legal decision entirely depends on a question of statutory meaning, 
interpretation alone cannot resolve or decide cases. 
Third, I will argue that judges do not act illegitimately when they do 
something that isn’t strictly “interpretation.”  I will explain that arguments 
about whether one method of statutory construction “interprets” or 
“rewrites” statutes has clouded and confused the nature of the judicial 
task.  We have wrongly shoehorned essential tasks of judicial decisionmaking 
into the category of interpretation.  We have done this, in part, because 
we mistakenly believe that judges only act legitimately when they 
interpret texts.  This confusion is unnecessary because the fact that such 
tasks are not interpretive renders them no less legitimate.  Indeed, the 
rule of law itself requires judges to do more than merely interpret laws. 
My conclusion that Intentionalism contains no prescriptions for legal 
decisionmakers does not mean that Intentionalism brings nothing to law.  
Quite the opposite is the case.  Intentionalism reveals why debates about 
how judges ought properly to interpret texts have proven so intractable.  
Intentionalism exposes that the debates about what interpretation is and 
is not are, in actuality, arguments about the task of judicial decisionmaking.  
These debates are intractable, and ultimately insoluble, because the fact 
that our system requires unaccountable persons to make binding legal 
decisions will forever remain in tension with our commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law.  Discussing these worries under the guise 
of arguments about which methods produce a text’s real meaning, 
however, creates distracting, and ultimately meaningless, sideshows. 
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Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels first argued in Against 
Theory5 that “what is intended and what is meant” by a text “are 
identical.”6  In other words, a text’s meaning is no more and no less than 
what the author intended it to mean.  The entire task of textual 
interpretation therefore entails recovering what the author intended to 
communicate.  All theories of interpretation are ultimately empty and 
counterproductive: theories are only meaningful if there is “a choice 
between alternative methods of interpreting”;7 but there is no choice if 
the “only plausible object of interpretation is the authors’ intended 
meaning.”8 
Applied to legal texts, Dean Stanley Fish has concluded that “[t]here 
is and can be no . . . distinction” between “statutory or constitutional 
interpretation that is faithful to the clear meaning of a text and statutory 
interpretation that ‘goes outside the text.’”9  There is no such distinction 
because “[t]he act of construing an utterance is inseparable from the act 
of assigning or imputing intention . . . .  Imagining a purposive agent who is 
responsible for a set of sounds or inscriptions is not an act auxiliary to, 
or distinct from . . . interpretation; it is interpretation.”10 
On Intentionalism’s account, interpreting the meaning of a particular 
text requires determining the intentions of the author who produced that 
text.  Construing a text’s meaning with regard to an ordinary English 
speaker, or with regard to some other imagined or constructive speaker, 
does not generate an interpretation of the meaning of that text.  Instead, 
it produces a meaning of the text that reflects the characteristics of the 
imagined speaker.  The meaning generated by such an exercise literally 
re-authors the text. 
Thus stated, Intentionalism challenges lawyers’ traditional concepts of 
interpretation.  If Intentionalism is true, as I will assume in this paper, 
we only interpret texts when we are recovering the author’s intended 
meaning.  But lawyers and legal scholars commonly use the word 
 5. Knapp & Michaels, supra note 3, at 723. 
 6. Id. at 729. 
 7. Id. at 730. 
 8. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the 
Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND PRACTICE 187, 187 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). 
 9. Stanley Fish, What is Legal Interpretation 1 (April 2, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
 10. Id. 




interpretation (as in “statutory interpretation” or “constitutional interpretation”) 
to include more than that.  Legal interpretation encompasses a wide 
variety of techniques for ascertaining a text’s meaning.  We can interpret 
the text of a statute to accord with the ordinary meaning of its words, in 
light of the statute’s evident purpose, by deferring to an administrative 
agency’s interpretation (if the statute’s text does not rule it out), or by 
rewriting the statute to avoid an absurd result.  We often refer to each of 
these activities as “interpretation” (though we bicker unceasingly about 
which methods really interpret texts and which rewrite them). 
Current fashions in legal interpretation, like New Textualism, dynamic 
statutory interpretation, and practical reason, put these extra-intentional 
tactics at the forefront.  New Textualism insists that statutory texts 
themselves have objective and determinate meanings.11  The intent of the 
legislature is irrelevant because the statutory text alone possesses legal 
authority.12  Intentionalism apparently has nothing in common with New 
Textualism.  Meaning according to Intentionalism is inherently subjective; 
it is the meaning that the author intended (though once an author has 
formulated an intention and produced a text, the text’s meaning has 
status as a fact that could be objectively known). 
Intentionalism also stands at odds with Professor Bill Eskridge’s 
dynamic statutory interpretation.  Professor Eskridge draws on the 
hermeneutic view that interpretation is a creative and synthetic act: a 
reader produces a meaning from a text by considering the words of the 
text, the current context in which the question of meaning arises (that is, 
the problem created by the facts of a dispute and the consequences that 
an interpretation might have in this case and in future disputes), and the 
context in which the text was initially written (legislative intent might be 
one piece of this puzzle).13  The interpretive process hermeneutics describes 
is descriptive, not normative.  Professor Eskridge, though, puts a normative 
 11. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 24 (1997) (“Words do have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation 
that goes beyond that range is permissible.”); cf. id. at 29 (“the objective indication of the 
words . . . is what constitutes the law”). 
 12. Id. at 29 (“My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the 
intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion 
that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s 
meaning.”); see also id. at 17 (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the 
lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact 
which bind us.”); see also id. at 22 (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be 
observed.”). 
 13. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 60–64 
(1994) (explaining that hermeneutics suggests that statutory interpretation is dynamic in 
three ways: “the horizon of the text changes over time as the text is interpreted,” “the 
horizon of the interpreter changes over time as new interpreters replace old ones,” and 
“the interaction between text and interpreter changes as the statute is applied to new 
factual contexts”). 
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gloss on hermeneutics—if an interpreter cannot help but update a statute, 
she might as well make it a good and useful one for our present 
purposes.14  Intentionalists might grant that dynamic methods could produce 
normatively attractive results, but Intentionalists deny that dynamism’s 
methods have anything to do with “interpretation.” 
Practical reason has a lot in common with Professor Eskridge’s 
dynamic statutory interpretation,15 and it grants the hermeneutical insight 
that meaning is produced through an interpreter’s reflection on text and 
context.16 (The commonalities between the two are no accident, as 
Professor Eskridge grounds his dynamism in practical reason.)17  
Practical reason, however, values legal stability and tradition somewhat 
more highly; its adherents argue that judges’ commitment to the craft of 
legal decisionmaking and to incremental change will appropriately curb 
the excesses of judicial discretion.18  Practical reason rejects formalism 
because it is skeptical that formalism can deliver on its promises.  People 
do not actually construe statutes according to the rules of formal, 
deductive logic, and so formalism cannot curb judicial discretion.  
Moreover, formalism does not always produce optimal decisions.19  
According to practical reason, everything that could inform the best 
 14. See id. at 64 (arguing that the hermeneutic model “deepens our pragmatic 
understanding of statutory interpretation” because it exposes the fact that a text cannot be 
understood outside of some particular factual application—statutory interpretation “is the 
work of application”) (quotation and citation omitted). 
 15. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation 
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 323–24 (1989) (drawing on the 
hermeneutical insights of Hans-Georg Gadamer that “[i]nterpretation . . . is the search for 
common ground between interpreter and text” and arguing also that interpretation must 
take into account “‘evolutive’ arguments that stress the change in circumstances between 
enactment and decision”); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: 
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 537–38 (1992) 
(identifying Karl Llewellyn as a forerunner of the current practical reason movement and 
citing the current movement’s advocates). 
 16. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 323–24, 346–47. 
 17. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 55 (explaining how practical reason underpins 
his dynamic approach to statutory interpretation and describing how “human decision 
making” reflects the pragmatic idea that a decisionmaker’s intellectual framework 
“consists of a ‘web of beliefs,’ interconnected but different understandings and values”). 
 18. See Farber, supra note 15, at 538–39 (describing practical reason and quoting 
Llewellyn as saying that it is the “business of the courts to use the precedents constantly 
to make the law always a little better, to correct old mistakes, to recorrect mistaken or ill-
advised attempts at correction—but always within limits severely set not only by the 
precedents, but equally by the traditions of right conduct in judicial office”). 
 19. See SCALIA, supra note 11, at 20 (“Congress can enact foolish statutes as well 
as wise ones, and it not for courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former.”). 




result in this case and in future cases should be deployed—legislative 
intent, the actions of agencies and their glosses on the statute, precedent, 
the evolution of similar areas of law, etcetera20—in order to craft decisions 
and rules that fit better with existing values.  Judges must consciously 
weigh competing values and should be aware of (and humble about) 
their creative role in construing statutes and deciding cases.21  And they 
should approach the task of statutory construction with a helpful attitude, 
as judges solve real people’s problems and craft rules that will guide 
their future actions. 
If Intentionalism is right that none of these methodologies are 
“interpretive,” does that fact mean that judges who use them are lawless?  
Must lawful judges confine themselves to determining what the author 
of a statute or a constitution intended the text to mean and construing the 
statute accordingly? 
Before turning to these questions, let me clarify this essay’s terminology.  
To stave off unnecessary confusion, I will be using the word 
“interpretation” in the Intentionalist sense to refer to the process of 
recovering an author’s intended meaning, unless I am describing how 
the legal community talks about the judicial task.  When I refer to other 
methodologies that the legal community commonly refers to as 
“methods of interpretation,” I will refer to them as methods of “statutory 
construction.”  It will soon become clear that this concession to 
Intentionalist terminology cedes no substantive ground. 
II. 
Let me begin with my first question: if we accept Intentionalism’s 
account of interpretation, must we conclude that judges act legitimately 
only when they construe legal texts to accord with the authoring body’s 
intent?  Do judges act illegitimately if they, for example, construe texts 
to accord with the ordinary sense of the text’s words or to be consistent 
with how those same words or phrases have been used in other statutes? 
The answer is no.  We often speak of judges “interpreting statutes” 
and “interpreting the Constitution”22 as though the act of interpretation 
or statutory construction determined the case.  To decide a case, however, a 
judge must do more than recover the intent of the authors of some legal 
text.  Interpretation, so defined, is only one part of the complex task of 
 20. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 346–48. 
 21. Id. at 348. 
 22. Here, I use the word interpret in its broader, colloquial sense. 
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judicial decision making.23  The same is true for statutory construction 
more broadly conceived.24  Deciding what a statute means rarely 
resolves legal disputes.  Because judges invariably do more than 
interpret texts when they decide cases, the fact that they do more is no 
criticism of any particular decision; it could only be a criticism of 
judging as a mode of decisionmaking.  Judges do not act illegitimately 
when they engage in extra-intentional decisionmaking because they have 
no other choice; the legitimacy of their extra-intentional decisionmaking 
is entailed in the choice to have judges decide. 
So, how do judges decide cases under statutes?  My goal here is to 
suggest some of the various ways that legal decisionmaking must depart 
from the task of statutory interpretation, that is, it must depart from the 
task of recovering the intent of the author of a statute.  The following is 
by no means an exhaustive account, for a complete account of the 
process of legal decisionmaking may well be impossible (and at the 
least, it is beyond my abilities). 
Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate that judges must do more 
than interpret or construe statutes to decide a case is to offer a few 
examples.  I draw my examples from Title VII, because the basic 
concepts of law are familiar to most.  I will begin with City of Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart.25  For this example, 
I will stipulate the legislative intent.  I do this for two reasons.  First, I 
want to reveal the aspects of a legal decision that cannot be interpretive 
in the limited, Intentionalist sense of that word.  Second, I want to reveal 
 23. Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
382 (1960) (“[T]he court’s work is not to find . . . . It is to do, responsibly, fittingly, 
intelligently, with and within the given frame.”). 
 24. Llewellyn contended that the task of statutory interpretation is “to quarry out 
of a legislative text the best sense which the text permits.”  Id. at 381.  This observation is 
more complex than it may first appear, as it is clear that Llewellyn used the term “sense” 
to refer to far more than a text’s literal meaning.  “Sense” for Llewellyn included a 
judge’s duty to exercise “situation-sense”—to decide a case under statutory law so that it 
cohered with precedent, legislative policy and purpose, and what Llewellyn called “the 
nature and spirit of the inherited rule-machinery.”  See id. at 377–82.  I take Llewellyn’s 
reference to the “nature and spirit of the inherited rule-machinery” to mean the values 
embodied by the rule of law and to a judge’s duty to consider whether the rules used to 
decide today’s case will be workable ones for the future.  Once a judge has quarried the 
best sense of a statute, Llewellyn said that “a flock of questions start to home.”  Id. at 
381.  The key word in that sentence is “start.”  “Start” implies that once the statute’s meaning 
has been “quarried,” the case and its questions have not necessarily been decided.  The 
following sections of this article “quarry” what else a judge has to do.  See infra II.A–C. 
 25. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 




the aspects of a legal decision that must extend beyond questions of 
statutory construction, such as discovering the ordinary meaning of the 
words in the text (New Textualism) or construing the statute according 
to its plain meaning.  It is my contention that statutory interpretation in 
the Intentionalist sense and statutory construction in the broader sense 
rarely provide adequate grounds for a legal decision. 
A.  Factual Interpretation and Future Rule Coherence 
The Manhart Court evaluated the legality of the Los Angeles Water 
and Power Department’s employee pension plan.  The Water Department 
required higher employee pension contributions from women than men 
because women, on average, live longer than men.26  The Water Department 
reasoned that if men and women retire at the same age and draw equal 
pensions, women would, on average, draw pensions for a longer period 
of time than men.27  On average, women would thus collect more money 
than men.  To equalize pension payouts with employee contributions, the 
Water Department required women to contribute more per pay period to 
the pension fund than men.  A class of women plaintiffs sued, claiming 
that the pension’s funding scheme discriminated against them because of 
their sex in violation of Title VII. 
Forty years after Title VII’s passage, judges continue to debate what 
“discriminate against any individual . . . because of” race or sex means.28  
 26. Id. at 704. 
 27. Id. at 705. 
 28. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 538 U.S. 959 (2003) (resolving a split 
among circuits on the question of whether plaintiffs in “mixed motives” cases had to 
produce “direct evidence” of discrimination to prevail by holding that plaintiffs did not); 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that under 
certain circumstances, male plaintiff’s harassment by other men could state a claim for 
discrimination under Title VII, and resolving a split among circuits, which had variously 
held that same sex harassment was never actionable, was only actionable if the 
perpetrator was gay, or was actionable if members of one sex were treated worse than 
another); DeClue v. Central Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
outright refusal to provide women employees with restroom facilities did not create a 
hostile work environment for women); id. at 437 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (contending 
that employer’s refusal to provide restroom facilities could amount to discriminatory 
harassment); Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
there was an issue of material fact whether the University’s pay raises to women 
professors, which had been instituted in conjunction with a court-approved consent 
decree to end the women professors’ sex discrimination lawsuit against the University, 
constituted sex discrimination against male professors).  Recall, as well, the flap during 
the late 1990s about Hooters’s policy of hiring only women as food servers.  Many 
criticized the EEOC for filing a complaint charging that Hooters’s policy constituted 
unlawful sex discrimination.  See Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Gingrich Backs Major 
Budget Hike for EEOC; Speaker Urges Funds Be Used to Probe, Mediate Current 
Worker-Initiated Complaints, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at A19.  The EEOC ultimately 
dropped its complaint in response to political pressure.  Hooters had run an ad campaign 
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The debate often involves two senses of the term discriminate.29  On one 
side is the sense of discriminating against a person in a manner that 
subordinates that individual on the basis of her race or gender.  Race-
based affirmative action treats white persons and Black persons 
differently, but it does not discriminate against whites in the subordinating 
sense of the word discrimination.  On the other side is a broader 
definition of discriminate: treating persons of different races or sexes 
differently because of their race or sex.  A person need not bear ill will 
toward a group to discriminate against a group’s members, so long as the 
person intentionally treats one group’s members differently than another.  
Affirmative action does discriminate against whites under this definition. 
In the context of sex discrimination, the meaning of discriminate is 
even murkier because of the perverse way sex became one of the 
categories protected by the Civil Rights Act.30  For the moment, however, 
put that aspect of the legislative history to one side.  Assume that Congress 
featuring “a burly Hooter Boy in a blond wig, a stuffed T-shirt and orange shorts” and 
the slogan ‘Come on Washington, Get a Grip.’”  Ralph R. Reiland, The long arm of the 
(C)law, Hooters and the Bureaucrats, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at A18.  An EEOC 
spokesman explained, “Congress was deluged with ‘Get a Grip’ Hooters’ frisbees and 
postcards . . . and Congress controls the agency’s purse strings.”   Id. 
 29. For some reason, rarely, if ever, do judges consider whether “discriminate 
against” means or implies something different than “discriminate.” 
 30. When Title VII was first introduced in the House, it did not prohibit sex 
discrimination.  The Kennedy Administration and the Democratic and Republican leaders in 
Congress envisioned the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as mainly addressing race discrimination, 
and the bill was discussed and debated in those terms.  Southern Democrats opposed to 
Title VII introduced an amendment adding “sex” to the list of prohibited categories 
(“race, color, national origin, religion, and sex”).  Southern Democrats hoped that 
outlawing sex discrimination would kill the bill by making it too strong for opponents of 
race discrimination to stomach.  Liberal Democratic representatives and a bipartisan 
coalition of five women representatives joined with Southern Democrats to pass the 
amendment, while some of Title VII’s sponsors opposed it.  CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, 
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 114–18 
(1985).  Title VII ultimately passed the House and Senate with “sex” as a protected 
category, and Southern Democrats who voted for the amendment voted against the final 
bill.  Other than the debate over the addition of “sex,” there was little discussion about 
what exactly it meant to “discriminate against” a person because of his sex.  Because “sex” 
was added as an amendment, the House Report said nothing about sex discrimination.  
The Senate issued no committee report because the Civil Rights Act bypassed the 
committees and went straight to the floor for debate.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 15–16 (3d ed. 2001) (describing how the Civil Rights bill bypassed the Senate 
Judiciary Committee).  The Senate debate glossed over the issue of sex, because the 
Act’s sponsors and President Johnson focused on the issue of race discrimination.  
Divining Congress’s and the President’s intent regarding Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination from this history is not an easy task. 




intended discriminate in the broader sense—disparate treatment because 
of an individual’s protected class.  So, if the Water Department’s pension 
program treats women differently than men, it violates Title VII, even if 
the desire to subordinate women or stereotypes about women did not 
motivate the Water Department.  Does knowing what Congress intended 
the statute to mean determine a court’s ruling that the Department’s 
pension scheme violates Title VII?  Not necessarily. 
Indeed, knowing Congress’s intent doesn’t help the judge in Manhart 
at all because deciding whether the pension plan treats men and women 
differently is itself a hard question.  On one view of the facts, the pension’s 
funding scheme treated women and men equally.  Employees contributed to 
the pension scheme based on average life expectancy, which was largely 
a function of an individual’s sex.  Under such a scheme, some individual 
women would draw less money out of the pension system because they 
would die earlier than the average life expectancy for women.  The same 
was true for some individual men, too, because some would die before 
the average life expectancy for men would predict.31 
On the other hand, if women and men contribute equal amounts per 
paycheck to the pension fund based on a gender-blended life expectancy, 
more than half of the women retirees would draw pensions beyond that 
average age, while fewer than half of the men would.  In this light, a 
funding scheme that asked men and women to contribute equally 
discriminates against men.  The pension plan might violate Title VII, but 
a judge would have to dismiss the case because women plaintiffs would 
not have standing to complain about injuries to men. 
On a different view of the facts, however, the pension’s funding scheme 
treated individual women unequally in comparison with individual men.  
If we think of pensions as being a guarantee of a set payment per month 
after retirement until death, women paid more for that benefit than men 
and took home less money per paycheck than men.  Though this is 
probably nonsensical from an economic perspective, employees may 
well have thought of pensions in this way.  Employees paying into a 
pension system want a guaranteed monthly income of $X until death for 
the simple reason that no one knows when she will die.  Pensions aren’t 
gamed—people don’t live longer just to beat the system.32  The question 
 31. Indeed, if the Water Department bases employee contributions on median, not 
mean, life expectancy, then half of all women and half of all men collect less than the actuarial 
data had predicted, and half of men and women would collect more.  No individual can claim 
discrimination because of sex—whether that person dies before or after the median life 
expectancy determines whether pension draws exceed pension contributions. 
 32. This is with the possible exception of my Uncle Walter, who said that he was 
determined to live to 105 in order to draw more Social Security than he’d paid into it.  (I’m 
not sure whether he noticed—or cared—that his ambition was in tension with his communist 
sympathies.) 
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an employee will ask is, therefore, “How much will it cost to guarantee 
an income of $X per month?” 
An example about pension vesting best illustrates the pension funding 
scheme’s unequal effect on women.  Assume that the Water Department 
required employees to work for the department and contribute to the 
pension fund for two years before they vested in the plan.  If a man and a 
woman contribute to the pension plan for a year, and then leave their 
jobs, the woman employee will have contributed more to the plan than 
the man, just because she was a woman.  If a judge thinks that this is 
the best vantage point from which to view the facts, then the Water 
Department has treated women differently than men. 
Whichever way a judge chooses to view these facts, she is not 
interpreting or construing the statute; 33 she is figuring out what the facts 
mean.  Problems of factual interpretation arise frequently in cases.  A 
judge in Manhart might choose between the two accounts of the facts by 
thinking about the next case that might arise and by brainstorming about 
other situations in which women as a group tend to have some 
characteristic that men do not have, and vice versa.  For example, as a 
group, women visit the doctor’s office far more often than men do;34 this 
 33. It is at this point that an Intentionalist would try to fight my hypothetical, 
which stipulated that the only intent Congress expressed about the meaning of 
discrimination was that discrimination meant “disparate treatment,” regardless whether it 
had the effect of subordinating women.  If we abandon the terms of the hypothetical, it is 
certainly possible that Congress (or some part of Congress, depending on who was 
deemed to be the author of Title VII) thought that Title VII’s prohibition on 
discrimination would or would not have been violated if employers used sex based 
actuarial tables.  Congress probably did not form intent on such a specific question as the 
use of actuarial data.  More likely, Congress worried about the use of stereotypes, which 
is similar to actuarial data in the sense that both are generalizations about women.  
Stereotyping is somewhat different, though, because we often think of stereotyping as 
having a subordinating cast to it.  In contrast, actuarial data, particularly data about life 
spans, is wholly descriptive.  If so, a judge still faces a similar factual question as the one 
posed in the text above—whether using actuarial tables is a kind of stereotyping that is 
prohibited by Title VII. 
 34. See Donald K. Cherry & David A. Woodwell, National Ambulatory Medical 
Care Survey: 2000 Summary, 328 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, NO. 
12, tbl.3 (Dept. of Health & Human Services 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/ad/ad328.pdf.  Women between the ages of 15 and 24 are about twice as likely as 
men the same age to visit the doctor in a given year; women pay 232 visits to the doctor per 
100 persons; men pay 118 visits per 100 persons.  Women ages 25 to 44 are also nearly 
twice as likely as men to visit the doctor, paying 313 visits a year per 100 persons, while 
men see a doctor 164 times per 100 persons.  Women between the ages of 45 and 64 are 
over 25% more likely than men to pay a visit to the doctor; women in that age group see a 
doctor at a rate of 411 visits per 100 compared to 301 visits per 100 persons. 




is true even when pregnancy-related visits are ignored.35  If health 
insurance is more expensive for women, could employers, consistent 
with Title VII, require women to contribute more to their health care 
premiums than men?  Women in their twenties and thirties are also more 
likely than men to stop working for a while to stay home with children.36  
Employers who devote resources to training their workforces effectively 
spend more money training young women than men because they are 
less likely to recoup the costs of training young women.  Would Title 
VII permit employers to pay young women as a group less than they pay 
young men? 
In more general terms, the judge would decide whether the Water 
Department violated Title VII by considering the possible rules or 
principles that could be used to decide Manhart (for example, employers 
may not base employment policies on any generalizations about gender, 
or employers may make decisions based on true generalizations about 
gender, if the generalizations are either neutral or positive) and assessing 
how the different rules would affect other analogous fact situations.  
Some of the hypothetical fact situations the judge has imagined might or 
might not be similar to the core problem that Congress actually intended 
to solve (for example, paying young women less than men because one 
expects them to quit work to have children).  If so, that fact might 
influence the way she sees Manhart’s facts, but it is entirely possible 
that the hypothetical fact situations will be quite different than what 
Congress considered. 
Our system of precedent means that judges also have to consider the 
effect that the current decision will have on future cases.37  One rule or 
principle might also be easier than others to apply consistently in future 
 35. Pregnancy cannot explain why women between the ages of 45 and 64 visit the 
doctor more often than men of the same age.  Id. 
 36. According to current population survey data, about 87% of women and about 
91% of men aged 25 to 34 who did not have minor children worked.  Among people 
with minor children, over 96% of men worked, while only 70% of women did.  The 
younger the children are, the greater the difference between men and women’s labor 
force participation.  More than 97% of men 25 to 34 who had children under the age of 3 
worked; only 63% of women in that age group with children under 3 did.  In other 
words, men with very young children were slightly more likely to work than men with 
older children and men with no minor children, while women with very young children 
were far less likely to work than women with older children or women with no minor 
children.  See Marisa DiNatale & Stephanie Boraas, The Labor Force Experience of Women 
from “Generation X”, 2002 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 tbl.1, 9 (2002), www.bls.gov/ 
opub/mlr/2002/03/art1full.pdf  (reporting that the data “suggest[ ] that raising children 
continues to have a greater impact on the working lives of mothers than on those of 
fathers”). 
 37. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) 
(arguing that “equally[,] . . . precedent looks forward . . . , asking us to view today’s 
decision  as a precedent for tomorrow’s decisionmakers”). 
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cases; the difficulty or ease with which a rule or principle can be applied 
in the future often, and appropriately, affects how cases are decided.  For 
example, the rule that employers can use neutral or positive generalizations 
about gender might be hard to apply.  Is the generalization that women 
leave the workforce to have children a negative or neutral one?  What 
about the generalization that women tend to be more nurturing than 
men?  The fact that women live longer than men carries no moral freight, 
but most other generalizations about the differences between women and 
men are more ambiguous.  A rule that turns on a generalization’s positive or 
negative implications could produce very different results in different 
hands and would be a reason to reject basing a decision on such a rule. 
Judges may also consider whether a rule or principle would be likely 
to generate results in future cases that are inconsistent with the meaning 
of the statute.  For example, whether deciding that the pension plan 
treated men and women equally would imply that denying women 
between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four places in management 
training programs would not violate Title VII because so many women 
in that age group drop out of the work force for some significant period 
to raise children.38  Quite obviously, authorial intent and statutory meaning 
matter in determining whether some future result would be inconsistent 
with the statute’s meaning.  But neither statutory meaning nor authorial 
intent is decisive—especially if the principle generated to decide the 
current case could be limited to avoid contradictory future results. 
In our hypothetical, the judge will only face a question of statutory 
interpretation or construction head-on if she decides that the pension 
plan actually treats women and men differently.  If she does, the 
question she will face is this: Women and men are treated differently, 
but are they treated differently in a way that matters under the statute?  
In other words, are they discriminated against?  Is different treatment 
enough or must that different treatment also subordinate women?  The 
pension plan treats men and women differently, our judge has decided, 
but it does not reflect negatively on women or reflect stereotypes about 
women’s subordinate status to men.  At this point, we bring out our 
familiar toolkits of statutory construction.  An Intentionalist might decide 
that Congress’s intent decided the matter: Congress, in our hypothetical, 
intended “discriminate against” to include all disparate treatment on the 
 38. I mean to imply nothing other than women are still more likely than men to 
shoulder the responsibility for caring for young children.  See supra note 36.   




basis of some protected class, whether it was subordinating or not.  Even 
an Intentionalist, however, might not consult the congressional history to 
find out what the intent was.  (More on this in a moment.) 
As we have seen, the judge in our hypothetical had to decide many 
other noninterpretive issues before she ever got to the issue of statutory 
interpretation or construction.  The fact is the meaning of the statute 
doesn’t always decide cases.  In some statutory cases like Manhart, 
factual interpretation lies at the root of the decision.  Our hypothetical 
also revealed that future cases also influence the outcome of current 
cases in two ways.  First, from a rule of law perspective, judges care 
whether the rule or principle used to decide the present case could be 
applied consistently to future cases.  Second, judges also consider 
whether a rule or principle will produce results consistent with the 
statute’s principles in future, analogous cases. 
B.  Coherence with Past Decisions 
Courts rarely write opinions on a blank slate.  Some other court has 
usually decided a case under the statute, and that decision will influence 
the judge’s interpretation or construction of the statute’s meaning in this 
case.39  Obviously, stare decisis applies if a higher court issued a prior 
decision on similar facts and construed the same statutory provision.  But 
even if an earlier case doesn’t control the current case, it might still 
influence a judge’s conclusions about the statute’s meaning, especially if 
the prior case has taken the statute in a particular policy direction.40  The 
rule of law recommends consistency among decisions—it is fairer to treat 
like cases alike,41 consistent decisions send clearer signals to those who 
have to live under the law, 42 and statutes are more likely to channel 
behavior if a statute has consistently been construed to attain similar 
policy ends.43 
 39. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons about how Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 
(1950) (“If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, . . . the court must do the 
merging . . . .”). 
 40. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 698 
(1995) (holding that a broader, more protective construction of the Endangered Species 
Act was justified in light of TVA v. Hill’s holding and its observation that the 
Endangered Species Act was “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of 
endangered species ever enacted by any nation”). 
 41. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 37, at 595–96. 
 42. Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1611 (2004) (“[S]tare decisis is said to promote stability and 
predictability in the law.”); Schauer, supra note 37, at 589. 
 43. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 91 (rev. ed. 1964) (“If the 
legislative draftsman is to discharge his responsibilities[, he] must be able to anticipate 
rational and relatively stable modes of interpretation.”). 
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United Steelworkers of America v. Weber44 illustrates the push and 
pull of precedent on judicial decisionmaking.45  Brian Weber, a white 
steelworker, sued the United Steelworkers union and Kaiser Steel.  He 
argued that the union’s and Kaiser’s race-based affirmative action plan 
for placement in a craft workers’ apprenticeship program violated Title 
VII.  Kaiser and the union created this program voluntarily.  They 
reserved half of the places in the apprenticeship program for African 
Americans, and they filled the other half according to the applicant’s 
seniority, without regard to race.  The Court took Weber to decide if 
Title VII forbade private employers and unions from adopting voluntary, 
race-based affirmative action programs designed to benefit Black 
persons. 
A judge might decide the case by focusing on the phrase “discriminate 
against” and asking what Congress meant by that phrase.  Did Congress 
intend “discriminate against” to mean discrimination that causes or 
reinforces the racial or gender subordination of that individual, or did 
Congress think that treating persons of different races or sexes 
differently because of their race or sex was discrimination, regardless of 
the benign or malignant motivations of the employer.  If Congress intended 
the former, then affirmative action plans to benefit African Americans 
probably are not “discrimination against” whites, as USW and Kaiser 
did not limit whites’ entry into the apprenticeship program because they 
thought poorly of whites as a group or thought whites were generally 
unqualified for the positions.  If Congress intended the latter, then the 
affirmative action plan did discriminate against Brian Weber: USW’s 
and Kaiser’s good or ill will toward whites is utterly irrelevant so long as 
they did treat Brian Weber differently because he was white. 
The available evidence does not clearly resolve whether Congress 
intended the words “discriminate against” to prohibit only race-based 
decisionmaking that subordinated members of a disfavored group or to 
prohibit all uses of race, “benign” uses included.  Some statements in the 
legislative history point one way;46 others point in the opposite direction.47  
 44. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 45. My analysis of Weber draws shamelessly on conversations with Phil Frickey 
and Bill Eskridge. 
 46. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 202–07 (reviewing the legislative history that suggested 
that Title VII permitted private employers’ voluntary affirmative action programs). 
 47. See id. at 230–52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reviewing the legislative history 
that suggested that Title VII prohibited private employers’ voluntary affirmative action 
programs). 




The lack of clarity on such an important point may be explained by the 
times.  In 1964, the prototype case of discrimination was whites’ ill 
treatment of Blacks, and the concept of affirmative action was yet to be 
invented.  Congress may never have imagined that these two conceptions 
of discrimination could ever contradict each other. 
Two things are clear about Congress’s intent.  First, Congress passed 
Title VII and the Civil Rights Act primarily to improve the economic 
and social position of African Americans.48  Second, no one discussed 
voluntary, race-based affirmative action plans to benefit African 
Americans,49 probably because they seemed improbable in 1964 (though 
Congress had approved benefits for former slaves in the Freedmen’s Act 
a century before).  The legislative history suggests, in short, that Congress 
did not have a well-formed intent about race-based affirmative action 
plans (I will discuss the implications of inconclusive intent below). 
Whatever Congress intended discriminate to mean, two cases decided 
before Weber would necessarily shape the Court’s decision: McDonald 
v. Santa Fe Trail 50 and Griggs v. Duke Power Company.51  McDonald 
held that white employees could sue under Title VII for race discrimination, 
and that foreclosed the possibility that the Court could decide Weber by 
concluding that Congress intended Title VII primarily for the benefit and 
protection of African Americans, not whites.52  Overruling McDonald 
wasn’t in the cards, either; nor would it have been, even if some piece of 
evidence had come to light demonstrating that improving African 
Americans’ economic and employment prospects—regardless of harm to 
whites—was Congress’s central and overriding concern.53  Overruling 
McDonald would have meant that some white plaintiffs’ suits would win 
and others would lose simply because some plaintiffs received final 
judgment before the case was overruled while others received judgment 
after.  Inevitably some cases will be overruled.  Some plaintiffs will lose 
and others will win just because of the timing of their suits.  But the rule 
 48. See id. at 202–05 (summarizing legislative history—including President Kennedy’s 
message to Congress when he initially introduced the Civil Rights Act—regarding the 
central importance of integrating Blacks and improving their economic opportunities). 
 49. Some members of Congress did worry that Title VII would require employers 
to racially balance their workforce and force them to hire a certain number of people 
because of their race.  It is clear from the text and history of Title VII that it does not.  
See id. at 232–34 & n.13 (quoting Representative Lindsay for the proposition that Title 
VII “does not . . . force acceptance of people in . . . jobs . . . because they are Negro”).  
The crux of this worry—that the government would force employers to adopt race based 
quotas—does not address whether employers on their own initiative may adopt voluntary 
race based affirmative action programs. 
 50. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 51. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 52. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1976). 
 53. To my knowledge no such evidence exists. 
MCGOWAN.DOC 6/7/2005  9:11 AM 
[VOL. 42:  711, 2005]  Against Interpretation 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 727 
 
of law’s command to treat similarly situated plaintiffs similarly means 
that courts hesitate to overrule cases just because they were “wrongly” 
decided. 
Griggs held that employers violated Title VII if they used facially 
neutral requirements or tests that disproportionately excluded African 
Americans from consideration for jobs or promotions, unless those tests 
or requirements were demonstrably job related.54  Kaiser and USW had 
instituted the affirmative plan because Kaiser’s skilled craft workers 
were nearly all white.55  Kaiser had required that craft workers have at 
least five years of industrial experience.56  Kaiser and the union knew 
this requirement was vulnerable under Griggs because it screened out 
disproportionately more African Americans than it did whites (largely 
because of widespread discrimination against Black workers prior to 
Title VII).  If they had been sued under Griggs before they had enacted 
this plan, the companies could have been ordered to pay backpay and 
frontpay to a class of African American employees.  Under Griggs, a 
court would also probably order them to undertake remedial measures to 
put African Americans into craftwork jobs.  Kaiser and the union 
thought that the affirmative action plan might prevent such a lawsuit and 
correct some of the effects of their past discriminatory practices. 
With Griggs lurking in the background, the Court had to decide 
whether Title VII prohibited employers from using race-based affirmative 
action to rectify past, discriminatory practices against Black persons.  If 
Kaiser and the union had lost a disparate impact suit under Griggs, a 
court unquestionably could have ordered Kaiser and USW to adopt a 
race-conscious plan very similar to the one that they created voluntarily.  
Furthermore, a ruling that Title VII barred employers from adopting 
voluntary race-based affirmative action programs could trap employers 
between plaintiffs—with disparate impact suits to the left and 
affirmative action suits to the right.  After McDonald and Griggs, the 
Court faced a slightly different question than “What did Congress mean 
by the word ‘discriminate?’”  Instead, this interpretive question confronted 
the Court: As between giving private businesses discretion to adopt 
voluntary measures to bring themselves into compliance with the law 
 54. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 55. Justice Blackmun’s concurrence reports that only 2% of craft workers were 
Black.  Weber, 443 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 56. The opinion doesn’t specify the type of prior industrial work.  Id. at 210 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 




and the rights of whites to colorblind treatment by employers, which 
would Congress prefer? 
For purposes of this essay, the upshot of Weber is this: Against the 
backdrop of the rule of law and regardless the enacting body’s intent, 
statutory construction and legal decisionmaking is inevitably dynamic.57  
In effect, stare decisis and the rule of law mean that precedents are 
post enactment factual developments that a court must weigh when 
deciding a case, just as it would weigh other factual developments.  Stare 
decisis does not mean that courts must always follow precedents, but it 
does mean that courts will weigh whether the benefits of deciding an 
issue anew outweigh costs of overruling an earlier case—costs to legal 
coherence, predictability, and to the principle of treating like cases alike.  
Judges rarely overrule cases just because an earlier case misinterpreted 
or misconstrued the law,58 and in the statutory context, the presumption 
against doing so is especially strong.59 
C.  And now, a word from Homer Simpson: “Doh!”  Statutes and 
literature are different 
Precedent and stare decisis uncover a fundamental difference between 
literature and law.  Literature, not law, first provoked Intentionalism.  
Statutes and literature do different things, which means that what we can 
permissibly do with each is different as well.  Simply put (and, I hope, 
not too simply put), authors write books, plays, and poems to 
communicate ideas and emotions and to tell stories to other people.  
Literary interpreters search for the story the author told or the idea she 
communicated.  Intentionalism’s account of literary interpretation thus 
describes what the essential object of literary interpretation must be—the 
meaning the author intended.  Intentionalism, thus, makes claims about 
truth—what the meaning of a text is.  Precedent and stare decisis fit 
poorly within the realm of literary interpretation.  If literary interpretation 
seeks a text’s true meaning, the fact that others have concluded that a 
literary work means one thing would not necessarily change another 
interpreter’s conclusion that the text means something else. 
 57. From a rule of law perspective, this conclusion is a bit ironic. 
 58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (explaining 
that “when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed 
by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective 
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case”) (plurality opinion). 
 59. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (expressing reluctance to 
overturn an earlier Court interpretation of the antitrust law, which created an exemption 
for baseball, because “Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to 
stand for so long”). 
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Not so with statutes.  Legislatures write statutes to encourage or 
discourage behavior or to provide methods for solving a problem.  Literary 
texts can be didactic and recommend certain courses of action, too, but 
they don’t have to be.  Statutes, in contrast, have got to be purposive to 
be laws.  Statutes don’t tell stories or float ideas.  A judge who has the 
tools to discover a statute’s “true” meaning can, consistent with the rule 
of law, construe the law in a different way.  The rule of law embodies a 
number of different values—disinterested decisionmaking, consistency, 
fairness, predictability, deference to democratically accountable lawmakers, 
and the list goes on.60  Legislative supremacy is but one aspect of the 
rule of law, albeit an extremely important one. 
Indeed, one can even argue that a judge can be more faithful to the 
idea of legislative supremacy by ignoring evidence of the authors’ 
intent—that is the upshot of New Textualism.  Justice Scalia, for example, 
argues that evidence of legislative intent—legislative history, press 
accounts, and the like—are apt to send conflicting and ambiguous 
signals to later decisionmakers.61  Judges who try to find the intent of the 
legislature are likely to be led down a garden path by strategic legislators 
or staffers who have packed the history of a bill with evidence of their 
preferred construction of a bill.62  And even if Justice Scalia overstates 
the inaccuracy of the legislative record, a judge might still avoid dipping 
into it.  The history of a single bill can fill several bookshelves in a 
library.  The sheer volume of paper makes it difficult to master the entire 
record.  Making it a practice to consult the legislative record could even 
imperil the rule of law and democracy.  Widespread reliance on legislative 
history could encourage sneaky, strategic staffers to surreptitiously slip 
their spin on the statute’s meaning into the legislative history.  Such 
legislative history might not reflect the deal struck in Congress on the 
statute’s meaning.  The sheer mass of legislative history also facilitates 
 60. John Rawls, for example, thought that the principles of “ought implies can,” 
similar treatment of similar cases, “no crime without . . . law,” and institutions for ascertaining 
truth and for the regular and correct enforcement of laws were necessary to maximize 
individual liberty under a system of law.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 236–37, 
239 (1971).  Lon Fuller argued that morality required that humans be treated as rational 
agents under law.  This moral requirement required that laws be general, public, generally 
prospective, and comprehensible.  Laws should not require contradictory duties, duties 
that cannot be performed, or duties that change frequently.  Officials also must agree to 
be bound by the laws.  FULLER, supra note 43, at 39 n.70. 
 61. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 35–36 (1997). 
 62. Id. at 34. 




the strategic and selective use of the materials by a judge.  In Weber, 
Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist each cite only those bits of the 
legislative history that support their positions, as though they were 
advocates, not judges.  Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp. 
provides a less controversial example than Weber of how indeterminate 
and malleable the legislative record can be.63 
Let’s return to the Manhart example.  I ended that section with the rather 
cryptic suggestion that an Intentionalist judge might not even consult the 
legislative history and, thus, would not know anything about what 
Congress had actually thought about what “discriminate against” meant.  
Can it be that Intentionalists truly would ignore legislative history?  Isn’t 
Intentionalism all about finding what the legislature intended? 
Yes, but a thoroughgoing Intentionalist could still insist that judges 
should not consult legislative history in search of what the legislature 
intended, even if exceedingly clear evidence of congressional intent 
exists in a particular case.64  She could give several different reasons for 
her injunction.  She could argue that consulting the legislative history in 
order to shed light on Congress’s intent creates an additional interpretive 
problem—not only must a judge try to figure out what Congress meant 
in the statute, but also what the authors of committee reports intended 
them to mean, what individual congressmen and senators meant by their 
statements in the record, and whether Congress intended for us to 
consult those materials.  She might point out a further difficulty with 
using these materials: lots of different members of Congress speak, but 
not all of them speak as authors; a judge must decide whose statements 
count as evidence of authorial intent and whose do not.  Even when 
these authors are located, their statements are themselves “texts” that 
must be interpreted, and our interpretation of them may also require 
judgment calls about what counts as evidence of that particular person’s 
intent.  An Intentionalist may think that the average judge lacks either the 
acumen or the resources to engage these historical questions well or 
wisely.  An Intentionalist might also agree with Justice Scalia that the practice 
of consulting legislative history encourages the strategic, surreptitious 
shaping of the legislative record to favor a particular gloss on the statute, 
 63. Compare Schwegmann, 341 U.S. 384, 388–95 (1951) (opinion by Justice 
Douglas reviewing the legislative history that suggests that the Sherman Act and the 
Miller-Tydings Act did not permit liquor distributors to enter into minimum resale price 
agreements with liquor retailers) with id. at 398–411 (concluding that the legislative 
history supports permitting such agreements) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 64. Knapp and Michaels suggest much of this when they observe that “recognizing 
that interpretation is always historical gives no help in deciding what counts as the best 
historical evidence, [and] it also gives no help in deciding between competing 
interpretations of any text.  Intentionalism . . . is therefore methodologically useless.”  
Knapp & Michaels, supra note 8, at 196. 
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rendering those materials unreliable indicia of intent.  She also may believe 
that, as a general matter, legislative history is relatively unhelpful and 
forays into it rarely illuminate the issue of intent, such that the payoff 
from getting it “right” in the few cases where helpful legislative history 
exists pales in comparison to the effort wasted in the vast run of cases.65 
The foregoing presumes that Congress had an intention that a judge 
could follow.  Congress, however, may not have agreed on the statute’s 
meaning.  When two (or more) authors write something together, they, 
too, can disagree about the text’s meaning.  Even a single author can be 
undecided about what her text means.  What is an interpreter to do when 
many different individual authors write and vote for statutes (or write 
stories), but each intends the statute (or story) to mean something 
different?  To take Title VII again, some members might have intended 
Title VII to require colorblind treatment by employers; others may have 
intended Title VII only to prohibit discrimination motivated by animus 
towards a group or discrimination that subordinates a group. 
Disagreement has different consequences for law than for literature.  
Dual, inconsistent intents create no real problem for a literary interpreter.  
A literary text can have a coherent meaning even if its author intended it 
to mean two (or more) inconsistent things.  We can conclude—to no ill 
effect, except perhaps some aesthetic dissatisfaction—that an author 
intended two (or more) inconsistent meanings.  Concluding that an 
author intended two different things can satisfactorily resolve some 
literary puzzles—such as, why Merton refuses Milly’s bequest in The 
Wings of the Dove and ends his affair with Kate,66 or whether there are 
really ghosts in The Turn of the Screw.67  Perhaps Merton loves Kate but 
believes that he polluted their love by manipulating Milly and that it can 
only be redeemed by refusing the bequest; maybe he truly loves Milly, 
not Kate, and doesn’t want to sully Milly’s memory by using her money 
to marry Kate.  James could have quite coherently intended that Merton 
loves both Kate and Milly and that the ghosts both are real and are a 
 65. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court maximizes compliance with the rule of 
law, ironically, by making rules for lower courts to apply; lower courts, in his opinion, 
can apply rules far more consistently than standards, which might more accurately 
capture a statute’s meaning, across a range of similar cases). 
 66. HENRY JAMES, THE WINGS OF THE DOVE 397–407 (J. Donald Crowley & 
Richard A. Hocks, eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 2003) (1902). 
 67. See generally HENRY JAMES, THE TURN OF THE SCREW (Deborah Esch & 
Jonathan Warren, eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1898). 




figment of the governess’s imagination.  The idea that an author intended 
inconsistent meanings may even make literature more lifelike.  Real life 
lacks an omniscient narrator who knows the future as well as the past, 
and people often do things for incomplete or inconsistent reasons 
without being aware that they are doing so.  We can even re-describe an 
author’s inconsistent intentions as a single intent: the author intended the 
text to have multiple meanings. 
Statutes, however, cannot be coherent texts if they mean two different 
things.  Nor can judges decide that a statute means two contradictory things, 
even if it happens to be true.  Statutes are supposed to resolve disputes 
among people and to regulate conduct.  This assertion does not deny that, as 
a matter of fact, authors of statutory texts can have inconsistent intentions.  
Some have speculated that statutes are purposefully written ambiguously 
because the authors do have inconsistent intentions and were either 
unaware of this fact because of the textual ambiguity or chose to paper 
them over with the ambiguous language.68  But a judge must decide a 
case.  If some of the statute’s authors intended the statute to mean one 
thing and others something else, the judge will have to disregard at least 
one of the authors’ intentions. 
IV. 
If everyone in the legal community agreed today what “interpreting a 
statute” means, nothing would change.  If we all became card-carrying 
Intentionalists, we would still rail about lawless judges and wring our 
hands about judicial discretion, and we would argue just as loudly if we 
all hopped on Justice Scalia’s New Textualist VW Bus.  That’s not just 
because we are lawyers and like to argue. 
Determinate textual meaning may not determine legal decisions.  
Cases are conflicts.  What a statute means as a matter of interpretation or 
construction need not be the same as what the statute means to, or in 
terms of, a conflict.  Certainty regarding an author’s meaning will influence 
a decision, but it does not necessarily entail a decision.  Deciding a case 
entails far too many other types of decisions besides the applicable law’s 
meaning for that to be the case.  Knowing a statute’s meaning to a 
certainty might influence some of those other decisions, but it would not 
resolve them.  Judges must still make judgments and judgment calls 
about what happened before the parties came to court, what will happen 
once a judgment is rendered, and what tradeoffs different decisions and 
 68. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 30, at 57 tbls.1–2 (suggesting that public choice 
theory implies that when legislation creates distributed benefits and concentrated costs, 
statutes will often be drafted ambiguously and left to an administrative agency to 
implement). 
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methodologies entail.  This list does not begin to exhaust the decisions a 
judge must make. 
Why, then, do we argue most loudly about the boundaries of interpretation?  
Why do we seem to assume that if we just figured out what interpretation is 
we will release the tension between individual decisionmaking and the 
rule of law?  Perhaps we shoehorn the many decisions a judge must make 
to decide a case into the term “interpretation” because of the mantra that 
legislatures make laws and judges interpret them.  Roscoe Pound put it 
this way: we call judicial decisionmaking “interpretation” because “the 
dogma of separation of powers . . . refers lawmaking exclusively to the 
legislature and would limit the courts to interpretation and application.”69  
Sweeping the entire panoply of decisions that judges must make under the 
rug of interpretation gives us, at least, the illusion that judges in our 
system conform to that dogma. 
Perhaps, too, it is comforting to mistake part of the problem for the 
whole problem.  Considering the problem of interpretation to be coterminous 
with the problem of judging lends the enterprise of judging some 
apparent legitimacy.  Viewing judging as limited to the task of interpretation 
casts judges as conduits who transmit the law rather than as sources of 
the law who necessarily possess the discretion to make it.  Interpretation 
may be the noble lie that we tell to those who must live by the decision. 
Whatever the reason, this tendency is unfortunate and unnecessary.  
Unfortunate, because it obscures what judges actually do when they 
decide cases.  Unnecessary, because judges can, consistent with the 
concepts of legislative supremacy and the rule of law, do things besides 
interpret laws.  Indeed, they must.  It strikes me, therefore, that the problem 
is not with judges and what they do and do not do.  Rather, the problem 
lies with the dogma to which Pound referred and the false and inaccurate 
boundaries it built.  The Constitution stuck us with judges who make 
judgments, not with conduits for the voice of the statute, and lived law 
would require judges (or persons very much like them) even if it had not.  





 69. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision: A Theory of Judicial Decision 
for Today, 36 HARV. L REV. 940, 946 (1922–23). 
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